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with the result of the instant case it might be well to be
aware of the possible limitations of the stated rule of the
case that marriages valid where made are valid everywhere.35

DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACT
Pennsylvania Threshermen and Farmers' Mutual
Casualty Insurance Company v. Messenger'
The plaintiff, a produce hauler of Salisbury, Maryland,
while operating his motor truck in Yemassee,l South Carolina, struck and damaged a filling station. At the time
of the accident the vehicle was insured by a liability insurance policy issued by the defendant company, insuring
the plaintiff against legal liability up to $5,000 for damage
to the property of others. The policy contained a clause
agreeing that the insurance company would defend all
suits brought against the insured on claims covered by
the policy, but they refused either to defend the attachment suit brought by the owners of the damaged buildings
or to pay the judgment recovered, basing the refusal to
act on the contention that the accident had not occurred
within the 500 mile radius covered by the policy. As a
result of the failure to act the truck and trailer were sold
on execution on the judgment for much less than they
were worth.
The instant suit was instituted by the insured alleging
a loss of the damaged truck and trailer as a result of the
breach of contract by the company. The trial court found
on expert testimony that the accident was within the 500
mile radius covered by the policy and made an award of
$1,500, the value of the damaged truck and trailer as found
by the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
89 For further examination of the subject of this note see Note, Foreign
Marriages in Evasion of Local Statutes (1942) 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 378;
Taintor, Effect of Extra-State Marriage Ceremonies (1938) 10 Miss. L. Rev.
105; Taintor, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of
Marriage (1939) 19 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 353; Deak, Conflict of Laws:
Recent Development Concerning Marriage,supra, n. 7; and Goodrich, Foreign Marriages and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 743.

'29 A. (2d) 653 (Md., 1943). For a note on the companion rule of
damages for breach of alternative contract, see (1943) 7 Md. L. Rev. 160.
",The name of the town is spelled Yamassee in the opinion. The various
standard atlasses give it Yemassee.
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The case is one of interest not on its rulings as to the
use of expert testimony, but rather as an application to a
new field of an established rule of damages. The Court in
its opinion cites the leading English case of Hadley v. Baxendale2 as laying down the proper rule for measure of
damages for breach of contract. In that case the plaintiffs
were owners of a mill, and, having broken their only mill
shaft, sent the broken shaft by the defendant, a carrier,
to the engineer to be used as a model for the new shaft
to be made by him. Due to the delay in delivery of the
broken shaft, delivery of the new shaft was delayed. The
plaintiff sued for breach of the contract of carriage, alleging as special damage the loss of profits of the mill during
the time the mill was idle due to the defendant's delay.
The Court held that there could be no recovery because
of a failure to prove that the defendant at the time the
contract was made had knowledge that the mill was kept
from operating solely for want of the shaft; but, in laying
down the rule which it considered applicable to ascertain
the damages recoverable for a breach of contract, the Court
used the following language:
"Where two parties have made a contract which
one of them has broken, the damages which the other
party ought to receive in respect to such breach of
contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably
be considered either arising naturally, i. e., according
to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself or such as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties at the
time they made the contract as a probable result of
the breach of it."
It will be noted that the "rule of Hadley v. Baxendale" is really a limitation on the primary rule of damages, that the court will by damages attempt to place
the injured party as far as possible in the position in
which he would have been had the contract been properly
performed. The sound logic of this limitation on the rule
has been almost unanimously recognized in the United
States, being adopted by the state and Federal courts,8
Exch. 341, 354 (1854).
, Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U. S. 1 (1894) ; Howard v.
Stillwell and Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U. S. 199 (1891); Taylor Mfg. Co. v.
Hatcher Mfg. Co., 39 F. 440, 3 L. R. A. 587 (C. C., S. D. Ga., 1889) ; Moulthrop v. Hyett, 105 Ala. 493, 17 So. 32 (1895) ; Cohn v. Norton, 57 Conn.
480, 18 A. 595, 5 L. R. A. 572 (1889) ; Moses v. Autuono, 56 Fla. 499, 47 So.
925, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 350 (1908) ; Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N. E.
153, L. R. A. 1917C 737 (1916) ; Hitchcock v. Supreme Tent of Knights of
Maccabees, 100 Mich. 40, 58 N. W. 640, 43 Am. St. Rep. 423 (1894) ; Gari29
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the leading encyclopedias of law,4 and the Restatement
of Contracts.5
Maryland has followed this view taken by the great
weight of authority, establishing the rule in a case as far
back as 1858, Abbott v. Gatch.6 In that case the plaintiff
sued for services rendered in the building of a new mill
and the defendant sought to set off, by way of recoupment,
the profits which he would have made had the plaintiff
completed the mill within the contract time. The Court
refused to allow such a claim because the profits of a new
mill were speculative, and dependent on too many contingencies to be provable as damage. But in laying down
the rule of damages applicable in breach of contract the
Court laid down a rule almost identical with that quoted
above, and allowed the defendant only the fair rental value
of the mill for the period of idleness caused by the plaintiff's breach of contract.
The case of Hadley v. Baxendale has been consistently
cited and followed in the Maryland cases since its adoption
by our courts.7 Both in Maryland and the other courts
of the United States the rule has been applied to breaches
of widely varied types of contracts, 8 so it is only logical
that the breach of contract having been established9 the
baldi v. Rubenstein, 99 N. J. L. 223, 122 A. 727 (1923) ; Mortimer v. Otto,
206 N. Y. 89, 99 N. E. 189, Ann. Cas. 1914A 1121 (1912) ; Wilson v. Wernwag, 217 Pa. 82, 66 A. 242, 10 Ann. Cas. 649 (1907). Note however criticism of the rule on the ground that it is obscure and inaccurate, for parties
did not contemplate a breach but performance. See Daugherty v. American
Union Telegraph Co., 75 AJa. 168, 51 Am. Rep. 435 (1883) ; McNamara v.
Village of Clintonville, 62 Wis. 207, 22 N. W. 472, 51 Am. Rep. 722 (1885);
the cases have since been overruled in both states.
425
C. J. S., Damages, See. 24a; 15 Am. JUR., Damages, Sec. 52.
CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 330.
'RESTATEMENT,
0 13 Md. 314, 71 Am. Dec. 635 (1859).
7Abbott v. Gatch, 13 Md. 314. 71 Am. Dec. 635 (1859); United States
Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. Dec. 519 (1868) ; Camden Consolidated Oil Co. v. Schlens, 59 Md. 31, 43 Am. Rep. 537 (1882) ; Furstenburg v. Fawsett, 61 Md. 184 (1884) ; Lanahan v. Heaver, 79 Md. 413, 418,
29 A. 1036 (1894) ; Strasbaugh v. Sanitary Can Co., 127 Md. 632, 648, 96 A.
863 (1916); Winslow Elevator Co. v. Hoffman, 107 Md. 621, 69 A. 394
(1908).
8 Moses v. Autuono, 56 Fla. 499, 47 So. 925, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 350
(1908), (breach of contract to lease land) : Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62,
112 N. E. 153, L. R. A. 1917C 737 (1916) (breach of brokerage contract) ;
United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. Dec. 519 (1868),
(breach of contract to send telegram properly) ; Winslow Elevator Co. v.
Hoffman, 107 Md. 621, 69 A. 394 (1908), (breach of contract to install elevators in set time) ; Furstenburg v. Fawsett, 61 Md. 184 (1884), (breach
of contract for sale of wood).
9 In the language of the Court: "But the refusal of the insurance company to defend the attachment suit and to pay the damages resulting . . .
caused the insured to lose his truck and trailer. Unquestionably the company's failure to perform these obligations constituted a breach of contract."
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rule set forth above should properly be applied. It is submitted that the instant case is an intelligent extension of
the rule of damages for breach of contract into the field
of insurance. The insurance company, dealing as it did
in risks and legal liabilities of others assumed by contract,
was certainly most fully aware that on its failure to perform the obligations required by the liability insurance
policy some loss might be suffered by the insured. And,
where the insured is an interstate trucker what action is
more to be supposed probable than an attachment proceeding against the one thing of value which is in the
grasp of the injured party? Such a loss following the
breach of contract by the defendant company is certainly
one of the results "arising naturally" out of the breach of
contract, and by application of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale would make the defendant company liable for the
entire loss sustained.

VALUE OF WIFE'S INCHOATE DOWER IN
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, Etc.'
In a Federal land condemnation proceeding, the question arose as to whether the owner's wife is entitled to
any of the damages awarded her husband, for destruction
of her inchoate right of dower. The question generally
does not arise, because checks for payment of such damages are usually made payable to husband and wife jointly.
Here the problem arose because the wife, who was in
Greece, had given her husband a very broad power of
attorney; but a Treasury regulation, as construed, prohibited the receipt of any moneys by a husband as the
wife's agent. On the basis of Federal cases, 2 the District
Court felt that it was obliged to decide this case according to Maryland law. The Court concluded that, under
the Maryland law, the wife's inchoate dower could not
be valued and so, in the principal case, nothing had to be
withheld for the wife's protection.
146 F. Supp. 441 (D. C. Md., 1942).

Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. R. Co., 258 U. S. 314 (1922) ; Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
2

